Excellency,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) mandated pursuant to paragraph 27 of Security Council resolution 2111 (2013).

I am writing generally regarding the status of modifications to the arms embargo on Somalia provided for by Security Council resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013), and specifically pursuant to the reporting requirements given to the Monitoring Group in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013). The investigations of the Monitoring Group regarding the arms embargo on Somalia are ongoing and the observations below reflect preliminary conclusions regarding trends identified by the Monitoring Group. However, this initial assessment is being provided to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (hereafter “the Committee”) in advance of the 6 March 2014 deadline set by resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013) and the forthcoming informal consultations of the Committee on 21 February 2014.

The Monitoring Group has identified a number of issues and concerns over current management of weapons and ammunition stockpiles by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), which point to high level and systematic abuses in weapons and ammunition management and distribution. In addition, the Monitoring Group assesses that the FGS has not complied sufficiently with the provisions of paragraph 9 of resolution 2111 (2013) in respect of its requirement to report to the Security Council on its military structure, logistical infrastructure and arms control procedures. Furthermore, notification procedures for the delivery of weapons to Somalia appear to be insufficiently detailed and pose serious challenges to the ability of the Monitoring Group to monitor the diversion of weapons in a context where the FGS has only agreed to give partial visibility over its stockpiles to the Monitoring Group.
Limited access to FGS Stockpiles

Under paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), the Monitoring Group has been requested to report on its ability to monitor delivery of weapons, military equipment and assistance to Somalia. During the course of the mandate to date, the Monitoring Group has experienced a number of difficulties, notably a lack of access to Somali National Army (SNA) armouries as well as contending with confusion generated by poorly notified or un-notified deliveries originating from States participating in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As the FGS has provided little information in respect of its logistical infrastructure for the storage of weapons, the Monitoring Group has used its own resources to establish the status of existing FGS warehouses and then attempted to establish whether imported weapons have been stored in any of these warehouses as their first port of call.

The FGS has completed the construction of an armoury in the Halane area within the AMISOM secured perimeter of Mogadishu International Airport in late 2013. The Halane storage facility is now being used as the officially declared logistical base for the SNA. Prior to its construction, the FGS officially relied on armouries at: (1) Villa Baidoa (the main SNA military logistical base in Mogadishu); (2) Villa Gashandiga (historically a Ministry of Defence facility); and (3) Villa Somalia (the main civilian government complex and seat of the Presidency). While these armouries were programmed for inspection on 23 January 2014 by the Monitoring Group, representatives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), international non-governmental organisations and international arms experts, access to Villa Baidoa and Villa Somalia was cancelled by the National Security Advisor to President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, while access to Villa Gashandiga was cancelled due to a security threat. As such, the only SNA warehouse inspected by the Monitoring Group with the facilitation of the FGS was Halane.

The inspection of the Halane warehouse logbooks revealed that a number of notified deliveries from Uganda (notified by the FGS on 3 July 2013, S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.63) and Djibouti (notified by the FGS on 12 August 2013, S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.90) were delivered in July and August 2013 before Halane’s construction was completed. A table of these deliveries is presented herewith:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Exporter</th>
<th>Notification Quantity</th>
<th>Logged at Halane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 rifle (3 July)</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKMS rifle (12 August)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKMS magazine (12 August)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM machine gun (12 August)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 rockets (12 August)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 39 mm amm (12 August)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>199,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 54R mm amm (12 Aug)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>10 packets</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK-19 grenade (12 August)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The Monitoring Group is investigating this anomaly, which may be the result of other PKM machine guns delivered that were not part of the 12 August 2013 notification.
2 It is possible that this was a notification error and that the figure provided (35) referred to the number of cases, rather than the number of weapons. If this were true the figure would suggest 35 cases, each containing six rounds, amounting to a total of 210.
With the exception of the PKM machine guns, all of the above weapons and ammunition could not be accounted for anywhere at Halane by the Monitoring Group and are either located in other storehouses, which the Monitoring Group was not granted access to, or have been distributed elsewhere. The Monitoring Group has developed serious concerns that the 1,000 AK-47’s delivered from Uganda have been diverted out of FGS control. This specific case will be elaborated on in the section related to notifications below.

Following these deliveries, the Monitoring Group understands that much of the material included in the FGS notification of 29 July 2013 (S/AC.29/2013/NORE.80) regarding items purchased from Ethiopia have been stored at Halane, having been moved out of Villa Somalia and other warehouses for presentation to the Monitoring Group on 23 January 2014. However, the quantity of items logged as the original deposit in Halane from Ethiopia, in respect to the 29 July 2013 notification by the FGS, appears to be far less in quantity than what was notified, indicating that only a partial quantity of what was notified has been stored and logged. It is possible that not all the deliveries of equipment from Ethiopia have been made, since the first supply aircraft crashed on arrival at Mogadishu International Airport in August 2013 and caused subsequent delays of deliveries. Further verifications are still ongoing to establish whether what has arrived is still greater than what has been logged at Halane.

In addition to the stock from Ethiopia, the FGS has received further equipment from Djibouti, details of which are found on a 3 October 2013 packing list, which was not notified to the Committee. The Monitoring Group cannot confirm why this notification was never made but does not rule out a breakdown in communication between the FGS in Mogadishu and the Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic to the United Nations. The items listed on the packing list show quantities much greater than what appears in the Halane warehouse logbooks as the original delivery, suggesting that only a partial quantity of what was included on the 3 October 2013 packing list has been stored and logged in an accountable manner. It is possible that not all the deliveries have taken place, and the Monitoring Group is currently verifying this.

A table documenting the notifications of equipment from Ethiopia and Djibouti and the packing list summarises the situation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Exporter</th>
<th>Quantity Listed</th>
<th>Logged at Halane</th>
<th>Not logged at Halane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-pattern assault rifle (29 July)</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2,755</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalashnikovs 39x7.62 (3 Oct)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM machine gun (29 July)</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 launcher (3 Oct)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7 rockets (3 Oct)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DShK machine gun (29 July)</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DShK 12.7mm (3 Oct)</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Type</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Quantity (Received)</td>
<td>Total Quantity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 39 mm</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>1,944,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 39 mm</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>400,500</td>
<td>291,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 54R mm</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>150,320</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 54R mm</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>99,680</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.7 x 108 mm</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>49,500</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the gaps in information the Monitoring Group is faced with, it is impossible to quantify what the scale of diversion of weapons stocks have been, if any. However, the Monitoring Group has obtained other pieces of qualitative evidence that point towards systematic abuses by the SNA. These are now discussed below.

**Diversion of SNA weapons stocks in violation of the arms embargo**

The Monitoring Group has identified at least two separate clan-based centres of gravity for weapons procurement within the FGS structures. These two interest groups appear to be prosecuting narrow clan agendas, at times working against the development of peace and security in Somalia through the distribution of weapons to parallel security forces and clan militias that are not part of the Somali security forces. The Monitoring Group has obtained information that senior figures employed by the FGS have been involved in the distribution of FGS weapons stocks to armed forces outside the security forces along clan and sub-clan lines. This will outlined further below. The Monitoring Group has obtained documentation revealing that one planned diversion of weapons was intended for an Al-Shabaab leader. In addition, some of these individuals have been involved in coordinating deliveries of weapons and ammunition into FGS-controlled territory without notification to the Committee.

**Abgaal clan network**

The Monitoring Group has identified a core group of individuals within the Abgaal sub-clan of President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud who appear to be dominating the procurement of weapons as well as their distribution from SNA stockpiles. Two senior officers within the SNA responsible for weapons allocations have confirmed that this network has favoured a distribution of military logistics towards an Abgaal-dominated brigade operating in Middle Shabelle. This brigade in turn is collaborating with a number of Abgaal militia forces in the Jowhar area, where for the last several weeks there have been frequent clashes between Abgaal fighters and Bantu militia, with the former evicting Bantu militia and civilians from their lands.

SNA sources, and sources involved in providing logistical support to the SNA, have confirmed that elements of this brigade have provided weapons to allied Abgaal units during the course of these clashes. In addition, the Monitoring Group has also obtained documentary evidence corroborating information that a key advisor to the President, from his Abgaal sub-clan, has been involved in planning weapons deliveries to Al-Shabaab leader Sheikh Yusuf Isse “Kabukatukade”, who is also Abgaal. Numerous sources within the FGS have explained to the Monitoring Group that the strategy of this network is to reinforce its position as the key political and military power base for the President.

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3 The Monitoring Group will discuss the nature of this evidence with the Committee.
**Habar Gedir clan network**

The Monitoring Group has also obtained information concerning the role of a senior FGS minister from the Habar Gedir sub-clan having autonomy over recent weapons purchases from a foreign government in the Gulf. The Monitoring Group has established that this minister visited the country in question during the course of August 2013, where a delivery of weapons to Mogadishu was coordinated. The Monitoring Group has received credible evidence of un-notified weapons deliveries by air from the Gulf state to Mogadishu during the course of October 2013, which would constitute a direct violation of the arms embargo. Indeed, after delivery, some of the weapons were moved to private locations in Mogadishu. Investigations are ongoing.

In addition to this, the Monitoring Group has received information of the involvement of the same minister in providing logistical support for the creation of militia forces in the central regions of Somalia, in cooperation with a known general from the SNA. The Monitoring Group is particularly concerned about such a military build-up given clashes between Habar Gedir sub-clan militia and heavily armed Puntland troops that have already taken place near Galkacyo on 1 November 2013.

The Monitoring Group has further received information that other Habar Gedir warlords and military commanders have also been receiving privileged access to weapons through Federal Government channels. In particular, sources within the SNA confirm favourable distribution of weapons towards a largely Habar Gedir – Ayr dominated brigade that has been involved in frequent clashes in previous weeks with Biyamal clan\(^4\) troops in the K50 area, and that has been cooperating with Ayr militia to drive Biyamal civilians off their lands.

**Cooperation between Abgaal and Habar Gedir**

Cooperation between elements of the Abgaal and elements of the Habar Gedir appears to be a high political strategy employed by top officials in the FGS. The Abgaal and Habar Gedir are historically the two most powerful sub-clans of the larger Hawiye clan, which dominates South Central Somalia, but during Somalia’s civil war elements of the Abgaal and Habar Gedir were often fierce rivals for political control over Mogadishu. In the context of tensions between the Hawiye, who are entrenched within the FGS, and the Darod clans of Puntland and Jubaland, cooperation between Abgaal and Habar Gedir could be interpreted as an attempt to reinforce cohesion within the Hawiye. Indeed, the Monitoring Group has obtained documentary evidence that reveals an Abgaal advisor to the President discussing the distribution of weapons between on the one hand Abgaal forces in Al Shabaab and on the other hand a Habar Gedir leader from central Somalia.

The trends described above demonstrate that the implementation of the FGS security policy is being captured by clan and sub-clan politics. Weapons distribution along clan lines for the purposes of prosecuting clan warfare is ultimately reducing the prospect of a cohesive

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\(^4\) A minority clan.
strategy by the FGS against *Al Shabaab*. Indeed, the Monitoring Group is concerned that clan warfare in Jowhar and K50 has also drawn in *Al Shabaab* fighters who have taken advantage of the deterioration in security conditions to strike against *Abgaal* brigade elements and launch numerous attacks between K50 and Afgoye, an area which *Habar Gedir* brigade elements have failed to secure since their deployment there.

The activity of the two brigades and their associated militia have been accompanied with alarming reports of violations of international law involving the targeting of civilians that the Monitoring Group is receiving and attempting to verify. Testimonies have been collected by the Monitoring Group from direct and indirect victims of conflict in villages around Jowhar in November and December 2013 and around K50/K60 in Lower Shabelle between September and December 2014. These credible testimonies include allegations of indiscriminate attacks by *Abgaal* and *Habar Gedir* armed forces on civilian areas resulting in the killing and wounding of children, women, and unarmed young men; rape; looting and burning of villages, and extrajudicial executions. Thousands have been displaced by these conflicts with over 2000 households fleeing from villages around Jowhar in early November alone.

**Marketing of SNA stockpiles in newly established arms markets in Mogadishu**

The Monitoring Group has obtained information pertaining to the establishment of new private arms markets in Mogadishu in which stock from the SNA is being sold.

Sources of the Monitoring Group who have visited these arms markets have received information that large quantities of ammunition supplied to the FGS has been leaked by rogue elements of the SNA into these markets. The Monitoring Group is in the process of collecting physical evidence, some of which already matches samples of ammunition that match ammunition in existing SNA stockpiles. Verifications are ongoing.

Sources in the markets say rifles supplied to the SNA are being sold in the markets. The Monitoring Group has obtained photographic evidence from one market of weapons, some of which have had their serial numbers deliberately grinded off from both the external surface of the weapon as well as from the internal firing pin, presumably to obscure the origin of the weapons. This is the first time the Monitoring Group has observed this phenomenon in Mogadishu. Verifications are ongoing. In addition, the Monitoring Group has obtained separate photographic evidence of a new AK-pattern assault rifle in one illicit market which matches the exact type supplied by Ethiopia to the SNA. The serial number on that rifle is in sequence with serial numbers inspected on Ethiopian-supplied rifles in Halane.

In one market, market dealers have informed sources of the Monitoring Group that weapons and ammunition not sold in the market during the day are taken back to storage in garages and houses that are owned and operated by SNA officers resident in the area. Agents of *Al Shabaab* are known to frequent the market to purchase weapons and ammunition and were easily identifiable by the salesmen there. Information from the Group’s sources in the markets indicates that weapons are being moved to Galkacyo, a major trafficking hub in central Somalia, as well being sold to *Al Shabaab* in Jubaland. Sources in the markets also claim that
prior to November 2013, most weapons sold were black market weapons, whereas dealers now say the greatest supply of weapons is from SNA stocks.

**FGS compliance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2111 (2013)**

In the context of the above trends, the Monitoring Group would like to draw to the Committee’s attention that the obligations by the FGS to report on its structures, infrastructures and procedures have not been sufficiently met. It is the assessment of the Monitoring Group, further to its previous report (S/2013/413, annex 6.2, paragraphs 51 and 52), that the information provided to date does not respond adequately to requirements delineated in paragraph 9 (a), (b) and (c), which are designed to adduce greater organisational clarity within the Somali armed forces as well as to provide clarity to the Security Council and to partners of the FGS on security structures as they currently exist on the ground. More detailed information will not only facilitate a collective understanding of the Somali security forces’ capacities and needs, but also provide an opportunity for partners to assist the FGS to develop institutional capacity in a more coordinated and cohesive way. A defined security sector structure will also enable Somali authorities to trace any misappropriation of government military equipment through a transparent chain of custody, and therefore allow federal authorities to exert greater control and accountability over its own armouries.

In respect of paragraph 9 (a) of resolution 2011 (2013), which calls for reporting on the structure of the Security Forces of the FGS, the Monitoring Group notes that the FGS provided a partial and aspirational organisational chart of the Somali armed forces command in its transmission of 2 April 2013 (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.34), as well as some background information on the newly constituted National Security Council in its correspondence of 6 October 2013 (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.109).

In respect of paragraph 9 (b) of resolution 2111 (2013), which calls for reporting on the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment, the Monitoring Group notes from the 2 April 2013 communication of the FGS, the proposal to construct an armoury in the Halane area within the AMISOM secured perimeter of Mogadishu International Airport. In its communication of 6 October 2013, the FGS stated that it continued to use only AMISOM armouries pending the construction of the ‘Halane’ armoury.

However, the Monitoring Group is aware of other Government storage facilities at Villa Baidoa, Villa Somalia, Villa Gashandiga and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) that have all been used to store military equipment in Mogadishu. It is worth reiterating, in this regard, that the FGS failed to allow access for the Monitoring Group and an assessment team composed of UNSOM, international non-governmental organisations, and independent arms experts, to visit Villa Somalia and Villa Baidoa on 23 January 2014, despite having confirmed in writing that such access would be granted. Independently, the Monitoring Group understands that large quantities of weapons are stored at Villa Somalia, the seat of the President’s office.
In respect of paragraph 9 (c) of resolution 2111, the FGS is expected to report on its procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution and storage of weapons by the Security Forces, as well as on training needs.

The Monitoring Group notes that the FGS has provided some basic information on its registration of weapons, the use of weapons cards and deployment of inspections in its correspondence of 2 April 2013. The Monitoring Group also notes the basic information provided on how weapons are issued at any given armoury as well as some pro-forma anti-hazard procedures for the management of stockpiles.

However, such information as provided is insufficient and does not address the core purpose of such a reporting requirement, which is designed to adduce greater institutional capacity for arms control within the FGS structures.

For instance, the reports of the FGS to date have not addressed the procedures in place for the receipt, verification, recording and reporting of weapons imports through any Federal Government-controlled seaport or airport. It is also unclear which Government body is responsible for the import of weapons and ammunition in the first instance. There appear to be no procedures in place for the transport and delivery of weapons within the SNA. Moreover, during its inspection of the SNA armoury in Halane, two stores at the headquarters of NISA, and a newly constructed depot at Police headquarters (not yet in use) on 23 January 2014 in Mogadishu, the Monitoring Group did not observe any use of registration and weapons cards systems as outlined in the FGS communication of 2 April 2013. Instead, the Monitoring Group only observed the use of handwritten ledgers documenting incoming and outgoing weaponry at the Halane store. The storage rooms at NISA did not appear to have any organisation for its arms and ammunition. In connection with this, there appears to be no procedural outline that delineates the responsibility at a central level for managing the audit trail of weapons.

The Monitoring Group has recommended to the FGS (S/AC.29/2014/SEMG/OC.7) that it provide detailed reporting on the following items, and suggests the Committee could reiterate these recommendations in writing, if it agrees, to the FGS.

1. **Identification of all SNA brigades.** Such information should include locations of brigade and battalion headquarters, as well as names of current commanders at the brigade, battalion and sector level.
2. **Strength and numbers of SNA brigades and battalions.** Such information can be based on payroll or other available information.
3. **Clan composition of any given brigade.** While this information may not be immediately retrievable, the Monitoring Group would suggest that any future registration process commissioned by the FGS for individuals assigned to any given brigade include documentation of clan as a requirement, given that clan composition of any given brigade constitutes an important determining factor of its cohesiveness and its behaviour.
4. **Details of any allied militia considered to be fully integrated into the SNA.**
5. Details of strength, number and location of all police forces under FGS authority.
6. Relevant details pertaining to NISA.
7. Details on all available SNA and Somali National Police Force armouries and storerooms under FGS control, complete with information of location, storage capacity, staffing capacity, arms and ammunition management accounting systems, and status of use.
8. Procedures for receipt, verification and recording of weapons imports through any Federal Government- controlled seaport or airport.
9. Procedures for the transport of weapons and ammunition within the Somali security forces.
10. Details of who is responsible at every level in the specific chain of command and custody for managing distribution and auditing of weapons.
11. Current systems of logging and auditing that have been implemented across different levels of the security forces.

Inadequately notified deliveries and stockpile accounting anomalies

In paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council requested the Monitoring Group to report on its own ability to monitor delivery of weapons equipment and assistance to Somalia.

In addition to limited access to FGS stockpiles, another major challenge faced by the Monitoring Group has been the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on what has been imported by the FGS in the first instance. This has largely been due to inconsistent quality of notifications by the FGS and/or the supplying Member States.

The FGS has often had no choice but to cut and paste information supplied by delivering Member States in order to include such information in a notification. However, given that much of the information the FGS cuts and pastes from the delivering Member State is of variable quality, information thus supplied to the Committee under such notifications tends to lack detail that can be used by the Monitoring Group for specific forensic accounting of stockpiles.

Through inspections of SNA stocks, the Monitoring Group has observed that some notifications have misclassified weapons that have eventually been supplied. In addition, details on the specific place and proposed dates of delivery were not provided in the notifications. In most cases, the deliveries have taken place later than the proposed dates of deliveries due to logistical delays, thereby negating the possibility for the Monitoring Group of anticipating an arrival and attempting to monitor its levels of compliance.

More specifically, the Monitoring Group has experienced the following difficulties in keeping track of military equipment that has been notified for delivery.
In the case of planned deliveries from Ethiopia (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.80), one of the delivering aircraft crashed on arrival at Mogadishu International Airport in August 2013. When Ethiopia resumed the deliveries, the Monitoring Group received information of only two further shipments routed through an AMISOM delivery in September 2013, but has obtained the overall packing list. The packing list showed lesser quantities than those stipulated in the original notification. If there have been additional deliveries to make up for the missing quantities, these have not been identified. When the Monitoring Group asked the National Security Advisor to the President of Somalia on 21 January 2014 whether additional deliveries had been made from Ethiopia, he was unable to provide an answer. However, items corresponding to notified deliveries from Ethiopia and actually logged at Halane total higher in number than what was indicated on the packing lists for the September 2013 deliveries. This indicates that there have been further deliveries from Ethiopia since September 2013, which the FGS did not provide information on, and which the Monitoring Group will now need to confirm with Ethiopia.

The Monitoring Group also understands that the FGS received a packing list of equipment to be supplied by Djibouti dated 3 October 2013, and which has now been obtained by the Monitoring Group. The FGS notified proposed deliveries of weapons and ammunition from Djibouti in August 2013 and stated that all were delivered to SNA units in AMISOM-controlled Sector 4. However, the Monitoring Group is not aware of any further notification that has been sent to the Committee regarding the 3 October 2013 packing list. The quantities recorded in the 3 October 2013 packing list exceed by a large number what has actually been logged at Halane as having been delivered by Djibouti. This could reflect the possibility that not all the equipment on the 3 October 2013 packing list was finally delivered, or it could reflect the possibility that some of the delivered stock was sent to locations other than Halane, leaving a balance at Halane that is considerably less than what is stated on the packing list.

In both cases above, the main conclusion that can be drawn is that notifications as they exist now lack sufficient information to allow the Monitoring Group to plan basic checks against FGS armouries. Indeed, the Monitoring Group often has to intensively investigate each notification for weeks before it obtains clarity on the contents of the notifications, and whether and when items were delivered or not.

While the two cases above illustrate some of the difficulty of accounting for SNA stockpiles, the Monitoring Group is alarmed to note that the FGS has openly contradicted its own accounts of where a delivery of 1000 AK-47’s from Uganda were distributed. The FGS stated in its letter to the Committee of 9 July 2013 (S/AC.29/2013/NOTE.63/Add.1) that all 1000 AK-47 rifles supplied by Uganda were for distribution between Brigades 1 and 6. However, FGS officials in the office of the National Security Advisor to the President of Somalia state that the weapons were split between the SNA and the Police in consignments of 300 and 700 respectively. Sources in Brigades 1 to 6 and in the police deny all knowledge of receiving any such distribution.

Given the state of affairs, and in order to improve the system of notifications for the purposes of achieving a more robust accounting baseline of SNA stocks, the Monitoring Group recommends that the Committee request supplying Member States and entities to provide more
specific information to the FGS for Committee notification or directly to the Committee when any planned delivery is being notified, as well as to report to the Committee after the delivery and/or distribution has taken place. Specifically, the Committee could request the following:

1. **Before delivery**, the supplying Member State or entity and the FGS should provide details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and ammunition, a description of the arms including weapon/ammunition type/model and calibre, quantity, proposed date of delivery, place of delivery and intended unit in the Somali security sector or the place of storage.

2. **Following delivery**, the delivering Member State or entity and the FGS should provide again the identical information above, in addition to which they should supply documents providing the serial numbers for such weapons and ammunition, shipping information such as a bill of lading or cargo manifests, packing lists, and specific place of storage where they have been delivered.

3. **Following delivery**, the FGS should declare to which unit these items have been supplied and to which specific place of storage they have been delivered.

**Options for the modification of the arms embargo pertaining to the FGS and autonomous regions of Somalia**

There are several options for the modification of the arms embargo as it pertains to the FGS.

1. **Total lift**: This option would allow the FGS to import all types of weapons, including the larger items listed in the Annex to resolution 2111 (2013), and the FGS would have no obligation to notify the Committee. One of the main problems with this option is that it would introduce into Somalia a class of weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles, which can pose a significant risk to the region.

2. **Total lift with notification procedures**: This option would allow the FGS to import all types of weapons, including larger items listed in the Annex to resolution 2111 (2013). However, the FGS and/or the supplying Member State would be obliged to notify the Committee either under a five-day non-objection procedure or a five-day advance notification as under resolution 2111 (2013). Again, this option would introduce a high-risk class of weapons into the environment.

3. **Status quo**: This option would simply extend the terms of resolution 2111 (2013) as they currently stand, but would not account for the security implications of the Monitoring Group’s observations outlined above.

4. **Status quo with enhanced notification and reporting requirements**: This option would maintain the current FGS obligation to notify the Committee of any import of weapons, except those listed in the Annex of resolution 2111 (2013). However, the FGS would be required to provide more detailed reporting on its structure, infrastructure and
procedures, such as recommended above. In addition, the FGS and the supplying Member State would be required to submit enhanced notifications and post delivery statements of fact.

5. **Partial tightening:** In this option, the FGS would retain its right to notify the Committee of any intended import of weaponry, except for items listed in the Annex of resolution 2111 (2013), but the notification would be subject to the five-day non-objection procedure that was previously required by the Committee.

6. **Partial tightening with enhanced notification and reporting requirements:** In this option, the FGS would retain its right to notify the Committee of any intended import of weaponry, except for items listed in the Annex of resolution 2111 (2013), under a five-day non-objection procedure. Also, the FGS would be required to provide more detailed reporting on its structure, infrastructure and procedures, such as recommended above. In addition, the FGS and the supplying Member State would be required to submit enhanced notifications and post delivery statements of fact.

7. **Reversal:** This option would be a return to the status quo ante, prior to the passage of resolution 2093 (2013), where the FGS would also lose its right to notify the Committee and all notifications would have to again be made by the supplying Member State, subject to a no-objection procedure by the Committee.

8. **Reversal with enhanced notification and reporting requirements:** This option would be a return to the status quo ante. However, the FGS would be required to provide more detailed reporting on its structure, infrastructure and procedures as recommended above. In addition, the FGS and the supplying Member State would be required to submit enhanced notifications and post delivery statements of fact.

Given the security implications of the Monitoring Group’s observations outlined above, the Monitoring Group would recommend an option of reversal of the modifications made to the arms embargo on Somalia in resolutions 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013). However, an alternative recommendation to the Committee would be to introduce, at the minimum, enhanced notification and reporting requirements, if not a partial tightening.

The Monitoring Group would also like to recommend that enhanced notifications and reporting requirements be applicable to regional autonomous authorities in Somalia, particularly if such requirements are applied to the FGS in any form.

Furthermore, given the challenges of monitoring the modifications to the arms embargo encountered by the Monitoring Group, the Committee may wish to consider the notion of attaching a small verification team to UNSOM that can undertake additional in-depth stocktaking and broader arms tracking in coordination with the Monitoring Group. The configuration of such a team may be adapted from models in other sanctions regimes.
The Monitoring Group remains available to the Committee to provide additional details as may be required and looks forward to answering any questions the Committee may have during its informal consultations on 21 February 2014.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Jarat Chopra
Coordinator
Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group